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DO COGNITIVE BIASES INFECT ADJUDICATION?  
A STUDY OF LABOR ARBITRATORS* 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Parties adjudicate their differences before numerous bodies, including 
judges, juries, administrative agencies, and arbitrators.  One of the most 
fundamental requirements of due process is that the adjudicators be free 
from bias.1 
Much bias, however, is not overt.  Rather, it results from the way in 
which our brains operate.  Every object is unique in a variety of ways.  Yet 
human beings cannot process an infinite variety of diverse characteristics.  
Consequently, we classify objects into categories which enable us to 
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 1. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-25 (1986) (holding that a 
justice of the Alabama Supreme Court violated an insurance company’s due process rights 
when he sat on a case which established precedent very favorable to the justice’s two 
pending lawsuits against other insurance companies); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 
U.S. 57 (1972) (holding that trial of an alleged traffic offender before the mayor of the 
municipality in which the alleged offense occurred violated the defendant’s due process 
rights where the mayor was responsible for municipal finances and traffic fines provided a 
substantial portion of municipal revenues). 
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process and interpret data.2  We then perceive members of the same 
category as being similar to each other and members of different categories 
as being different from each other.3 
We categorize people for similar reasons and in similar manners as we 
categorize objects, often stereotyping results.  “[T]o cope in a complex and 
demanding environment, people are ‘cognitive misers’ who economize by . 
. . categorization, ingroup preferences, stereotyping, and attribution bias.  
These processes, sometimes characterized as ‘cognitive short-cuts,’ occur 
regardless of people’s feelings toward other groups or their desires to 
protect or improve their own status.”4  Thus, “stereotypes are unconscious 
habits of thought that link personal attributes to group membership.  
Stereotyping is an inevitable concomitant of categorization . . . .”5 
People may be unaware of, and generally do not focus on, the fact that 
they engage in stereotyping:  ascribing group-level expectations to 
individual members of those groups.6  Indeed, stereotyping occurs among 
people whose beliefs are relatively free of bias or prejudice.7  Stereotypes, 
however, “bias[] in predictable ways the perception, interpretation, 
encoding, retention, and recall of information about other people.”8 
Researchers have identified two types of stereotypes:  (1) descriptive 
stereotypes and (2) prescriptive stereotypes.  Descriptive stereotypes 
attribute characteristics to members of a particular category or 
classification.  They can distort perception by leading the observer to 
 2. See Jerome S. Bruner, On Perceptual Readiness, 64 PSYCHOL. REV. 123, 123 (1957) 
(discussing the use of certain attributes to differentiate inputs and place them into 
categories). 
 3. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1175-77, 1188-89 (1995); Henri Tajfel & A. L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative 
Judgement, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 101-14 (1963). 
 4. Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 
CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321 (2000) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 5. Id. at 322. 
 6. See Marilynn B. Brewer, When Stereotypes Lead to Stereotyping:  The Use of 
Stereotypes in Person Perception, in STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING 254, 254 (C. Neil 
Macrae et al., eds., 1996) (defining stereotyping). 
254, 254 (C. Neil Macrae et al., eds., 1996) (defining stereotyping). 
 7. See William T. Bielby, Minimizing Workplace and Gender Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 
120, 121-22 (2000) (stating that individuals relatively free of prejudice can be equally as 
susceptible to stereotyping as those with animosity toward a particular group); Anthony G. 
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. 
REV. 945, 951 (2006) (“Implicit biases are especially intriguing, and also especially 
problematic, because they can produce behavior that diverges from a person’s avowed or 
endorsed beliefs or principles.”). 
 8. Krieger, supra note 3, at 1188; see also James L. Hilton & William von Hippel, 
Stereotypes, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 237, 237-71 (1996) (reviewing recent psychological 
literature with emphasis on the cognitive and motivational factors behind stereotyping). 
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attribute conduct by a particular member of a group to characteristics 
presumed to be held by all members of that group.9  In contrast, 
prescriptive stereotypes specify ways in which members of the group are 
supposed to behave.  They are often based on descriptive stereotypes and 
establish norms against which observers evaluate group members’ 
conduct.10 
The existence of such unconscious stereotyping has been known 
among psychologists and sociologists for decades.  Beginning with Linda 
Hamilton Krieger’s path-breaking article in 1995,11 legal scholars have 
focused primarily on the implications of such cognitive biases for the 
substantive law of discrimination.12  The business community has taken 
notice as concerns over cognitive bias have been raised in large class action 
discrimination lawsuits.13 
During the 1980s and 1990s, a large majority of state courts and 
circuit courts of appeals established gender bias taskforces.14  Among other 
things, some of the task forces were concerned with “unconscious 
prejudice.”15  Perhaps the most pernicious effects of such “unconscious 
prejudice” arise when it affects the outcomes of cases.  Gender or other 
characteristics of litigants and witnesses should generally not affect the 
outcome of a given case.  Finders of fact should not overtly or 
unconsciously evaluate a claimant’s claim or a respondent’s defense based 
on the party’s race, gender, ethnicity, or other irrelevant characteristics. 
This Article presents a study of whether irrelevant characteristics of a 
 9. See Reskin, supra note 4, at 322. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Krieger, supra note 3. 
 12. See, e.g., Symposium on Behavioral Realism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 477, 479-80 (2007); Tristen K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:  
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
91, 99-100 (2003); Mark R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on 
Land, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 466 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 479-522 
(2001); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1138-1143 (1999); see 
also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494-95 (2005) 
(discussing the role of concerns with cognitive biases in broadcast licensing); Martin H. 
Malin, Interference with the Right to Leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 7 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 329, 368-73 (2003) (discussing implications of cognitive biases 
in interpreting FMLA’s prohibition on employer interference with the right to leave). 
 13. See Roger Parloff, The War over Unconscious Bias, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2007, at 90. 
 14. For an excellent review, see Symposium:  The Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
603, 609-14 (1998). 
 15. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Will Inquiry Produce Action?  Studying the Effects of Gender 
in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 616 (1998) (quoting Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s foreword to the Report of the Special Committee on Gender of the D.C. Circuit 
Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias). 
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grievant in an arbitration conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement affect the outcome of the grievance.  In the study, we presented 
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators with four grievances 
involving the discipline or discharge of an employee where the event 
triggering the discharge resulted from a conflict between the employee’s 
work and family responsibilities.  We varied the grievant’s sex and one 
other characteristic of the case in an effort to determine whether implicit 
biases affect the outcome of the case.  Does a man fare better on the same 
facts than a woman?  Does a married parent fare better than a single 
parent?  Do conflicts over childcare receive a more favorable response 
from arbitrators than conflicts over eldercare? 
Part II of this Article discusses the role of labor arbitrators in 
adjudicating disputes over the interpretation and application of collective 
bargaining agreements and their evolving role as adjudicators of disputes 
arising under the public law.  Part III presents the study’s methodology and 
results.  Part IV offers some tentative implications for adjudicators 
generally based on the study’s results. 
II.  WHY STUDY LABOR ARBITRATORS? 
At first glance, labor arbitrators appear to be a relatively small and 
specialized group of adjudicators.  They are selected jointly by unions and 
employers to resolve disputes arising under the collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) which governs the employer’s employees.  It is rare that 
a CBA does not have a grievance and arbitration procedure. 
A grievance is a claim by an employee or union that the employer 
breached the CBA.16  For example, an employee who believes that he or 
she was disciplined or discharged in violation of a contractual requirement 
of just cause may file a grievance raising the claim.  The grievance 
procedure specifies a number of steps through which the grievance is 
discussed at successively higher levels within the union’s and employer’s 
hierarchies.  When the grievance is discussed at the highest level of the 
procedure and no agreement resolving the grievance is reached, the union 
may demand arbitration.  The CBA typically provides that the parties will 
jointly select the arbitrator and that the arbitrator’s award will be final and 
binding on all parties involved. 
Although parties have the ability to sue to enforce CBAs,17 such 
 16. Some CBAs also provide for employers to file grievances alleging that the union 
breached the contract. 
 17. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000) (“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer 
and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having 
jurisdiction of the parties . . . .”); Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 172 (1990) 
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lawsuits are usually impractical because of the time and expense involved.  
In the absence of a grievance and arbitration procedure, a union is far more 
likely to resort to a strike or lesser job action than to attempt to enforce the 
CBA.  Thus, traditionally, labor arbitration was regarded more as a 
substitute for workplace strife than for litigation.18  The Supreme Court has 
referred to the employer’s agreement to abide by the grievance and 
arbitration procedure as the quid pro quo for the union’s agreement not to 
strike during the term of the CBA,19 and Professor David Feller has 
suggested that the no-strike clause and the grievance and arbitration 
procedure are the true essence of the typical CBA.20 
At the heart of the labor arbitration system is the parties’ mutual 
selection of the arbitrator.  Because of such mutual selection, the Supreme 
Court views labor arbitrators as “indispensable agencies in a continuous 
collective bargaining process.”21  According to the Court, the collective 
bargaining agreement “is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to 
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman [of the written collective 
bargaining agreement] cannot wholly anticipate.”22  The arbitrator is called 
upon to help resolve those disputes that the parties either did not wholly 
anticipate, or for other reasons have decided to resolve through arbitration.  
“Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system 
of private law for all the problems which may arise and [] provid[ing] for 
their solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs 
and desires of the parties.”23 
Thus, according to the Court, “[t]he labor arbitrator is usually chosen 
because of the parties’ confidence in his knowledge of the common law of 
the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear 
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for 
judgment.”24  The parties have bargained for the arbitrator to “bring his 
informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem.”25 
Therefore, the arbitrator is selected by and accountable to the parties.  
The parties’ expectations, as perceived by the arbitrator, are the primary 
(holding that federal law provides a remedy for breach of a collective bargaining 
agreement). 
 18. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
578 (1960). 
 19. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970). 
 20. David Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL L. 
REV. 663 (1973). 
 21. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 
(1960). 
 22. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578. 
 23. Id. at 581. 
 24. Id. at 582. 
 25. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. 
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constraints on arbitral decision-making.26  The mutual selection process is 
self-policing.  Arbitrators who defy the parties’ expectations do not remain 
arbitrators for very long.27  Consequently, judicial supervision of labor 
arbitrators is extremely limited.  Courts must enforce an arbitrator’s award 
as long as the award draws its essence from the CBA,28 the most deferential 
standard of review known in the law.  Arbitral findings of fact are 
completely outside the bounds of judicial review.  “‘Improvident, even silly 
factfinding’ does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to 
enforce the award.”29 
This broad, unreviewable discretion that labor arbitrators have in 
deciding cases provides a compelling reason to study their decision-
making.  Arbitral approaches to decision-making have a strong flavor of 
legal realism.  More than forty years ago, Sylvester Garrett, one of the most 
distinguished arbitrators of his time, made the following observations on 
the role of intuition in arbitral decision-making: 
     The creative and intuitive nature of this [decision-making] 
function . . . has a counterpart in the conventional judicial 
process.  Judges are not often driven to given results in difficult 
cases by the inexorable compulsion of concepts, maxims, logic, 
and language.  Almost always there is a choice among several 
potentially applicable sets of principles. 
     One knowledgeable judge . . . has written that the vital 
motivating impulse for judicial decision often is a “hunch” or 
intuition as to what is right or wrong for the particular case.  
Judge Hutcheson’s explanation of the opinion-writing process 
will seem familiar to many an arbitrator.  He went on to write 
that, having reached a ‘hunch’ decision, “the astute judge, having 
so decided, enlists his every faculty and belabors his laggard 
mind, not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it 
pass muster with his critics.”30 
 26. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice:  A Jurisprudential 
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1198-99 (1993) (“Parties select arbitrators who they believe will 
resolve grievances in a manner consistent with [their] expectations.  In turn, arbitrators, who 
want to work again, generally do not disappoint them.”). 
 27. See generally Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 
YALE. L.J. 916, 928-31 (1979). 
 28. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. 
 29. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (quoting 
Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987)). 
 30. Sylvester  Garrett, The Role of Lawyers in Arbitration, in ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC 
POLICY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 102, 122 (Spencer D. Pollard ed., 1961) (citing Hutcheson, The Judgment 
Intuitive:  The Function of “Hunch” in Judicial Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 
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Twenty-four years later, Mr. Garrett reiterated his recitation of this 
model of arbitral decision-making and observed that since his initial 
observations, many other arbitrators had expressly concurred with that 
model.31 
The intuitive judgments involved in arbitral decision-making are 
influenced by the values held by individual arbitrators.  As James Gross 
observed, “We as . . . arbitrators . . . use values to judge the conduct of 
others in disciplinary cases and to determine what constitutes just cause for 
discipline in those cases.”32  These values, and their influence on arbitral 
intuitive judgments, evolve along with changing mores in society.  As 
Richard Mittenthal, commenting on Gross’s paper at the National Academy 
of Arbitrators’ Fiftieth Meeting, observed: 
Over the course of time, changes occur in how we view certain 
misconduct.  For instance, in the 1950s, sleeping on the job was 
often held to justify discharge for a first offense, while sexual 
harassment perhaps a mere written reprimand.  In 1997, the first 
time an employee is caught sleeping on the job will prompt no 
more than a brief suspension, while sexual harassment will be 
held to warrant discharge.  How things have changed.  
Widespread inattention to duty in the workplace seems to have 
downgraded the seriousness of a first sleeping offense.  And 
widespread revulsion against the abuse of women has 
transformed harassment into a “capital” offense.  Thus, a change 
in societal or workplace values alters arbitral value judgments, 
(1929)). 
 31. Sylvester Garrett, The Interpretive Process:  Myths and Reality, in ARBITRATION 
1985:  LAW AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 38TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 121, 144-46 (Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1986) (citing, inter alia, 
Gabriel Alexander, Reflections on Decision Making, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE 
ARBITRATOR’S ROLE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 1, 7 (Mark Kahn ed., 1962); Peter Seitz, How Arbitrators Decide Cases:  A 
Study in Black Magic, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR’S ROLE, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS at 159 
(Mark Kahn ed., 1962); see also Alex Elson (Chairman), Decisional Thinking, Chicago 
Panel Report in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
33RD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 63, 84-87 (James L. Stern & 
Barbara D. Denis eds., 1980) (describing how in making their decisions, arbitrators are 
influenced by their family, environment, formal and informal education and general 
experience); Howard S. Block (Chairman), Decisional Thinking, West Coast Panel Report, 
in DECISIONAL THINKING OF ARBITRATORS AND JUDGES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL 
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 119, 124-30 (James L. Stern & Barbara D. 
Denis eds., 1980) (noting how intuition plays a part in arbitrators’ decision-making process). 
 32. James A. Gross, Value Judgments in Arbitration:  Their Impact on the Parties’ 
Arguments and on the Arbitrator’s Decisions, in ARBITRATION 1997:  THE NEXT FIFTY 
YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 212, 213 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998). 
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which in turn affect our view of what is a reasonable penalty.33 
Mutual selection of the arbitrator by the parties legitimizes the role of 
arbitral intuition and value judgments in the decision-making process.  The 
parties typically recognize the arbitrator’s wide range of discretion and the 
major role that the arbitrator’s personal perspective on labor relations, as 
influenced by her background, training, and ideological viewpoints, can 
play in resolution of the grievance.  Consequently, the parties often pay 
attention to these matters when selecting an arbitrator. 
John Dunsford has observed that, once selected to hear a case, an 
arbitrator’s options in handling the matter are practically unlimited.  The 
only meaningful restraints are those tacitly conveyed by the parties as to 
their expectations.  As an arbitrator’s reputation and docket grow, a 
reciprocal conditioning comes into play.  The parties are presumed to be 
familiar with the arbitrator’s conduct, rulings, and decisions and, by their 
selection, represent that the arbitrator’s past performance is their expected 
standard for the current matter.34 
Similarly, Edgar Jones has commented on the link between the 
parties’ selection process and the legitimate role of the arbitrator’s personal 
values in resolving a grievance:  “[I]n this process of competitive selection, 
‘his own brand’ was analyzed and adopted [by the parties] as their own 
brand [of justice], whatever may have been their respective expectations . . 
. .”35 
The view of the arbitrator as a purely private dispute adjudicator 
reached its zenith in the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co.36  Gardner-Denver fired Alexander, who grieved his 
discharge as violative of the CBA’s requirement of just cause.37  His union 
pursued the grievance to arbitration, where an arbitrator held that Gardner-
Denver had just cause and denied the grievance.38  Alexander then sued 
alleging that his discharge was racially motivated, in violation of Title VII 
 33. Richard Mittenthal, Comment, Value Judgments in Arbitration:  Their Impact on 
the Parties’ Arguments and on the Arbitrator’s Decisions, in ARBITRATION 1997:  THE NEXT 
FIFTY YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBITRATORS 212, 231-32 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998). 
 34. John E. Dunsford, The Role and Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 109, 112-13 (1985). 
 35. Edgar A. Jones, Jr., A Meditation on Labor Arbitration and "His Own Brand of 
Industrial Justice", in ARBITRATION 1982:  CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 11 (James L. 
Stern & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1983) (emphasis omitted). 
 36. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 37. Id. at 39. 
 38. Id. at 42. 
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.39  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held that the adverse arbitration award barred 
Alexander’s lawsuit.40  The Supreme Court reversed.41 
The Court held, inter alia, that a union lacks authority to waive an 
employee’s right to a judicial forum for the employee’s statutory claim.42  
The Court also reasoned that the labor arbitration forum was ill-suited for 
resolving statutory claims and that labor arbitrators, as privately-appointed 
and privately-accountable adjudicators, were not institutionally competent 
to resolve such claims.43 
In recent years, however, the role of the labor arbitrator has evolved 
from a purely private interpreter of the parties’ CBA to a quasi-public 
adjudicator, interpreting and applying the public law.44  Ironically, one of 
the major legal developments broadening the role of the labor arbitrator 
occurred in the non-unionized sector.  A number of employers required 
employees, as a condition of employment, to arbitrate any claims arising 
out of their employment, including claims arising under regulatory statutes.  
Employees resisted enforcement of these agreements by bringing lawsuits 
under the relevant employment statutes.  All circuits that considered the 
issue, except for the Fourth Circuit, relied on Gardner-Denver and its 
progeny to hold that such pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory 
employment claims were unenforceable.45  In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp.,46 the Supreme Court sided with the outlier Fourth Circuit and 
held that an agreement contained in a securities exchange’s registration 
obligating the employee to arbitrate all claims against his employer was 
enforceable with respect to the employee’s claim under the Age 
 39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 40. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 51-52. 
 43. Id. at 52-53 & n.16 (citing Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor 
Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1955) (“[The arbitrator] is rather part of a system of 
self-government created by and confined to the parties.  He serves their pleasure only, to 
administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement.”)). 
 44. See Martin H. Malin & Jeanne M. Vonhof, The Evolving Role of the Labor 
Arbitrator, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 199 (2005). 
 45. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1990), 
vacated, 500 U.S. 930 (1991); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st 
Cir. 1989); Nicholson v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. 
Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Asplundh 
Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553-54 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Univ. of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1986). But see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197-203 (4th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding 
enforceable a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a statutory employment claim under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
 46. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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Discrimination in Employment Act.47 
Gilmer did not expressly overrule Gardner-Denver.  Instead, Gilmer 
distinguished Gardner-Denver as a case arising under a collective 
bargaining agreement where the arbitrator’s authority was limited to 
interpreting and applying the CBA and did not extend to resolving statutory 
claims.48  A major tenet of the reasoning employed in Gardner-Denver, 
however, was the Court’s view that the arbitral forum was poorly suited for 
resolving statutory claims.49  This aspect of the Court’s reasoning relied on 
the privately-selected arbitrator’s lack of institutional competence to 
adjudicate statutory claims.  The Gilmer Court flatly rejected that portion 
of the rationale: 
The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. also expressed 
the view that arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for 
resolving statutory claims.  That “mistrust of the arbitral 
process,” however, has been undermined by our recent arbitration 
decisions.  “[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion 
of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral 
tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an 
alternative means of dispute resolution.”50 
Not surprisingly, encouraged by the affirmance in Gilmer, the Fourth 
Circuit continued its pattern in arbitration cases and held that employees 
covered by CBAs were required to pursue their statutory claims through the 
CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedure.51  The Fourth Circuit was 
again an outlier, as all other circuits that addressed the issue held that 
Gardner-Denver continued to control.52  In Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Service Corp.,53 the Court declined to resolve the issue of whether an 
employee can be compelled to arbitrate a statutory claim under the 
provisions of a CBA.  The Court held, however, that if such an agreement 
 47. Id. at 23. 
 48. Id. at 33-34. 
 49. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58 (discussing how “[a]rbitral procedures . . . 
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights 
created by Title VII). 
 50. Id. at 34 n.5 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985)). 
 51. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879-885 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that arbitration of employees’ Title VII and disability claims was 
mandatory under the CBA). 
 52. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. 
Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 
F.3d 1437, 1452 (10th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 
519, 526 (11th Cir. 1997); Varner v. Nat’l Super Mkts., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 53. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
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efinitively. 
 
 
waiving the judicial forum is to be enforced, the agreement must be clear 
and unmistakable.54  In so doing, the Court recognized the tension between 
Gilmer and Gardner-Denver,55 but declined to resolve it d
Most courts considering defense requests to compel plaintiffs to 
arbitrate their statutory claims under their CBA have applied Wright and 
found no clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to litigate.56  Not 
surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit has found clear and unmistakable waivers 
and has dismissed employees’ lawsuits asserting statutory claims for failure 
to take those claims through the CBA’s grievance and arbitration 
procedure.57  In Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Corp.,58 however, the 
Second Circuit held that even a CBA’s clear and unmistakable waiver of 
the right to a judicial forum is unenforceable.  The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in Pyett and presumably will decide the issue left 
unresolved in Wright.  If the Court reverses the Second Circuit, “the 
ultimate question for the arbitrator would be not what the parties have 
agreed to, but what federal law requires . . . .”59 
Even if the Court affirms the Second Circuit in Pyett, the arbitrator’s 
role will continue to broaden from private adjudicator of private disputes to 
quasi-public interpreter of public law.  Parties have expressly incorporated 
the public law into their contracts through the inclusion of non-
 54. Id. at 80. 
 55. Id. at 75, 77. 
 56. See, e.g., Fayer v. Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(finding the arbitration clause at issue was even narrower than the clause at issue in Wright 
and therefore did not bar the plaintiff from bringing his First Amendment claims in a court 
action); Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that CBA’s 
arbitration clause did not contain sufficiently clear and unmistakable waiver of employees’ 
right to a federal forum with respect to claims under employment discrimination statutes); 
Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
arbitration clause in the CBA did not compel employee to arbitrate his ADA claim, because 
agreement did not explicitly reference ADA); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 630-
32 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that arbitration clause of CBA did not deprive district court of 
jurisdiction to hear the merits of an employee’s ADA claim, because the ADA was not 
specifically mentioned in the CBA); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 
1999) (holding that, in light of Wright, a CBA which did not specifically mention the ADA 
or any other federal anti-discrimination statute posed no bar to a lawsuit). 
 57. See, e.g., Aleman v. Chugach Supports Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 215-17 (4th Cir. 
2007) (dismissing employees’ lawsuits due to presence of “a clear and unmistakable 
provision under which the employees agree to submit to arbitration”) (quoting Carson v. 
Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999)); Safrit v. Cone Mills Co., 248 F.3d 
306, 307-09 (4th Cir. 2001) (dismissing employee’s Title VII claim because the CBA 
provided that the parties would “abide by all the requirements of Title VII,” and that 
‘[u]nresolved grievances under this Section are the proper subjects for arbitration.”). 
 58. 498 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett, 
128 S. Ct. 1223 (2008). 
 59. Wright, 525 U.S. at 79. 
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discrimination clauses in their CBAs, which commonly refer to Title VII 
and other public laws.60  Similarly, parties increasingly refer to the Family 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA)61 in their CBAs.62 
When employees and their unions grieve discrimination or other 
statutory violations, the arbitration, with increasing frequency, is the 
employee’s sole opportunity to resolve this claim.  For example, in Collins 
v. New York City Transit Authority,63 the plaintiff was fired after he 
allegedly assaulted his supervisor.  He grieved and a tri-partite arbitration 
board upheld his termination.64  Plaintiff sued, alleging that his employer 
discharged him due to his race and prior EEO complaints, in violation of 
Title VII.65  The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment and the Second Circuit affirmed.66  The court placed particular 
weight on the arbitration award upholding the plaintiff’s discharge.67  The 
court opined: 
[A] decision by an independent tribunal that is not itself subject 
to a claim of bias will attenuate a plaintiff’s proof of the requisite 
causal link [between the adverse employment action and the 
allegedly illegal motive].  Where, as here, that decision follows 
an evidentiary hearing and is based on substantial evidence, the 
Title VII plaintiff, to survive a motion for summary judgment, 
must present strong evidence that the decision was wrong as a 
matter of fact—e.g. new evidence not before the tribunal—or that 
the impartiality of the proceeding was compromised.68 
Other courts have reached similar results.69  A number of state courts 
 60. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 516 (Alan Myles Rubin ed., 
6th ed. 2003) (“It is common for many agreements to include nondiscrimination and anti-
sexual harassment [statutory] provisions.”). 
 61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000). 
 62. See Jeanne M. Vonhof & Martin H. Malin, What a Mess!  The FMLA, Collective 
Bargaining and Attendance Control Plans, 21 ILL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. REP., Fall 2004, at 
1, 3 (noting that parties are actually including the exact language from parts of the FMLA 
into their collective bargaining agreements). 
 63. 305 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 64. Id. at 117. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 118, 120. 
 67. Id. at 119. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Darden v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
the district court was correct in according the arbitrator’s ruling great weight); Martinez v. 
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1056, 2005 WL 1485246, at *1, *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 
2005) (applying Collins); Norris v. New York City Housing Auth., 2004 WL 1087600 at *1, 
*9 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2004) (also applying Collins); Clark v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 
336 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an arbitrator’s judgment should be given weight when 
procedurally fair); Umpierre v. SUNY Brockport, 1997 WL 599314 at *1, *4 (N.D.N.Y. 
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have held that employees who lost their grievances in arbitration were 
collaterally estopped from litigating common law tort claims arising out of 
the same set of facts.70 
If the Supreme Court upholds the Second Circuit in Pyett, its rationale 
will probably be that the union lacks authority to waive the individual 
employee’s right to a judicial forum for statutory claims.  Where, however, 
no such issue of agency is present, even the Second Circuit compels parties 
to arbitrate their public law claims under the CBA.  For example, in 
Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local 550,71 Interstate Brands sued 
the union under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act for 
damages resulting from an alleged secondary boycott.  The CBA’s 
grievance procedure provided for the parties to arbitrate “all complaints, 
disputes or grievances arising between them involving questions of 
interpretation or application of any clause or matter covered by this 
Agreement, or any act or conduct or relation between the parties hereto, 
directly or indirectly.”72 
Relying on Wright, Interstate argued that the strong presumption of 
arbitrability should not apply because it was pursuing a claim under a 
federal statute.73  Interstate maintained that any waiver of its right to bring 
its claim in federal court had to be clear and unmistakable.74 
The Second Circuit rejected the argument.  According to the court, 
Wright’s requirement of a clear and unmistakable waiver resulted from 
concerns with the union waiving the individual employee’s right to sue.75  
The court reasoned that the Wright requirement did not apply to an 
employer’s agreement in a CBA to arbitrate its statutory claims.76  
Accordingly, the court held that Interstate was required to arbitrate its 
Sept. 26, 1997) (holding that plaintiff’s inability to discredit the legitimacy of the 
arbitrator’s proceedings undermines plaintiff’s claims of employment discrimination). 
 70. See, e.g., Kelly v. Vons Cos., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 769-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(granting preclusive effect in fraud and negligent representation case to findings in labor 
arbitration over facility closure); Bulger v. Lieberman, 667 A.2d 561, 562 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1995) (making arbitration panel’s decision that employee resigned binding on her 
subsequent wrongful termination suit); Taylor v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., 656 
N.E.2d 134, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (ruling that collateral estoppel arising from prior 
arbitration precluded claims for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with contract, 
and negligent hiring).  But see Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358, 362-
63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to give arbitration award preclusive effect with respect to 
statutory claims); Camargo v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 855-56 
(Cal. App. 2001) (same). 
 71. 167 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 765. 
 73. Id. at 767. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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section 303 claim against the union.77 
Not surprisingly, courts are taking a broader view of labor arbitrator 
authority to interpret and apply the public law.  Courts have compelled 
employers to arbitrate grievances despite employer arguments that the 
grievance would necessarily require the arbitrator to interpret and apply the 
public law.78  They are also enforcing arbitration awards whose rationales 
are based on the arbitrator’s interpretation and application of public law.  
For example, in Butler Manufacturing Co. v. United Steelworkers of 
America,79 the employer discharged an employee pursuant to a negotiated 
attendance control plan embodied in a memorandum of understanding 
between the employer and the union.  The arbitrator determined that two of 
the absences for which the grievant had been charged were FMLA-
protected and ordered the grievant reinstated with half back pay.80  The 
employer sued to vacate the award.81 
The union argued that the award drew its essence from the contract 
and cited a provision of the agreement that stated, “Butler Manufacturing 
Company offers equal opportunity for employment, advancement in 
employment, and continuation of employment to all qualified individuals in 
accordance with the provisions of law and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement for the represented employees covered by 
it.”82  The district court, however, determined the quoted language to be 
“nothing but boilerplate anti-discrimination commitments that did not 
necessarily pull the FMLA into the agreement,”83 and held that the 
arbitrator exceeded her authority by relying on the FMLA.  The Seventh 
Circuit reversed.  The court reasoned: 
If there was some kind of “clear statement” rule that applied to 
CBAs and to the match between a CBA and an arbitrator’s 
authority, perhaps [the district court’s analysis] would have been 
right.  But there is no such rule.  Instead . . . the standard asks 
only whether the arbitrator’s interpretation can rationally be 
linked to the CBA.  Here, a broader look . . . demonstrates that 
the arbitrator’s award did draw its essence from the parties’ 
agreement.  Article 2, paragraph 13 . . . does not say only that 
 77. Interstate Brands Corp., 167 F.3d at 767. 
 78. See Cal. Correctional Peace Officers Ass’n v. State, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717, 726 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that arbitration was not precluded even though the issue in dispute 
was governed by statute); Knipp v. Lawrence County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 04CA34, slip 
op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2005) (finding that pursuant to a CBA, an employee was 
obligated to grieve and arbitrate her claim that her discharge violated a state statute). 
 79. 336 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 80. Id. at 632. 
 81. Id. at 631. 
 82. Id. at 633. 
 83. Id. 
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there will be “equal opportunity for employment . . . in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement . . .”  In the 
ellipsis between the word “employment” and the last phrase 
comes the phrase “in accordance with the provisions of law.”  
We have no reason to think that this reference to external law is 
either surplusage or “mere boilerplate.”  We find that Article 2, 
paragraph 13 conferred on the arbitrator the authority to consider 
the FMLA.84 
The First Circuit has taken an even more expansive view of arbitral 
authority.  In Coastal Oil of New England, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 25,85 the 
CBA provided, inter alia, that the employer would either maintain 
workers’ compensation insurance or provide injured employees with the 
same benefits as provided for in the Massachusetts worker’s compensation 
statute.86  The CBA covered only one of the employer’s three facilities.87  
The same union represented the employees at the other two facilities, but 
each facility had its own CBA.88 
An employee covered by the CBA was injured on the job.89  
Following his recovery, he sought reinstatement but was advised that there 
were no openings.90  The union and employer agreed that the employee 
would be reinstated to the next available opening.91  Subsequently, the 
employee learned of an opening at one of the other two facilities.92  When 
the employer refused to award him that position, he grieved and the union 
took the claim to arbitration.93 
The arbitrator, relying on the Massachusetts Worker’s Compensation 
Law, ordered the employer to reinstate the grievant to the position at the 
other facility which was covered by a different CBA.94  The First Circuit 
upheld the arbitrator’s authority to do so.95  Relying on Gilmer and its 
progeny, the court gave the employer’s attack on the arbitrator’s authority 
short shrift: 
How can the arbitrator, in determining whether appellant lived up 
to the contractual obligations mandated by . . . the Revere 
Agreement, fail to address whether the provisions of the 
 84. Id. at 633-34 (citation omitted). 
 85. 134 F.3d 466, 468 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 86. Id. at 468. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Coastal Oil of New England, Inc.,134 F.3d at 468. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 470. 
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Massachusetts Worker’s Compensation Law, incorporated into 
that agreement . . . have been met? 
     The response to this question as well as to appellant’s 
challenge to the arbitrator’s authority to interpret the 
aforementioned Massachusetts statute is self-evident.  Obviously, 
the arbitrator acted properly and within the scope of his delegated 
authority.  We can perceive of no valid reason why the parties 
could not also agree to have statutory rights enforced before an 
arbitral forum.96 
Thus, labor arbitrators have evolved from their original roles as purely 
private adjudicators of the parties’ private law, as expressed in their 
collective bargaining agreement, to quasi-public officers interpreting and 
applying the public law.  This evolving role of labor arbitrators provides a 
further basis for studying their decision-making. 
III. THE STUDY 
A.  Background 
More than ninety percent of all CBAs require just cause for discipline 
and discharge.  Employees who believe that they have been disciplined or 
discharged without cause may file grievances challenging those actions.  
An arbitrator might sustain a grievance completely, ordering the employer 
to reinstate the employee if discharged and to make the employee whole for 
lost wages and benefits.  The arbitrator may deny the grievance, allowing 
the discipline or discharge to stand.  The arbitrator may also sustain the 
grievance in part, reducing the discipline to a lesser penalty. 
Because of the effects that evolving societal mores and practices can 
have on arbitral interpretations of just cause, we chose to provide 
arbitrators with four grievances where the discipline or discharge arose out 
of a work-family conflict.  The demographic revolution in the workplace 
has become an accepted fact of life.  The 1950s model of a two-parent 
household in which only one parent worked outside the home has long 
faded into obscurity.  Today a child raised in such a household is in a 
distinct minority.  In March 2002, only 23.7% of all children in the United 
States lived with two parents and had only one parent in the labor force.97 
 96. Id. at 469-70.  But see Sheriff of Suffolk County v. AFSCME Council 93, 856 
N.E.2d 194, 198 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that an arbitrator lacked authority to 
interpret and rely on a state statute as the basis for decision). 
 97. See JASON FIELDS, CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS:  
MARCH 2002, at 9 tbl.4 (U.S. Census Bureau 2003) (showing that in 20.7% of families with 
two parents the father was the sole parent in the workforce, and in 3.0% of such families the 
mother was the only parent in the workforce). 
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The predominance of single-parent and dual-worker households has 
greatly increased the tension that employees feel between responsibilities to 
their jobs and responsibilities to their families.  For example, it has been 
estimated that one in three working families with children under six relies 
on split shifts for childcare (i.e., parents working different shifts so that 
each can care for the child while the other is at work).98  Additionally, an 
increasing number of workers—an estimated one-third of workers in a 
recent study—are responsible for caring for elderly parents and in-laws.99 
The external law has responded to these demographic changes in 
many ways.  Most visible is the FMLA.  Other legal developments, 
although not as visible as the FMLA, nevertheless reflect recognition of 
these societal changes.  For example, in Prickett v. Circuit Science, Inc.,100 
the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled prior case law and held that a 
single father discharged for refusing a shift change because he could not 
find childcare was entitled to unemployment benefits.101  The court rejected 
the employer’s argument that the claimant was disqualified because he had 
been terminated for willful misconduct.102  The court wrote: 
[W]e hold that the employee’s failure to report to a new shift 
assignment because of an inability to obtain adequate care for the 
employee’s dependent child does not constitute misconduct 
justifying denial of unemployment compensation benefits.  To 
hold otherwise would be to ignore significant facts about the 
world today.  In 1990, almost 60% of children in Minnesota lived 
in families in which both parents worked outside the home.  
Another 9.3% lived in families with one working parent.  If 
Prickett had left his child without supervision, he would have 
been subject to criminal sanctions.  He also could have been 
sanctioned for failure to support Kyle.  Under these limited 
circumstances, Prickett seemed to have no choice but to do as he 
did and we cannot hold that he engaged in “wilful 
misconduct.”103 
A review of published arbitration awards finds no consensus of 
arbitral opinion in handling discipline and discharge grievances arising out 
 98. See Harriet B. Presser, Toward a 24-Hour Economy, 284 SCI. 1778 (June 11, 1999) 
(relying on statistics from the Current Population Survey performed in 1997 in discussing 
the impact on families of the increased prevalence of nonstandard work schedules). 
 99. See JAMES T. BOND ET AL., HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NATIONAL STUDY OF THE CHANGING 
WORKFORCE 29 (2002) (examining survey results on the changing conditions of the 
American workforce). 
 100. 518 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1994). 
 101. Id. at 605. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 605-06 (citations omitted). 
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of work-family conflicts.  For example, in Town of Stratford,104 a police 
officer refused an order that she report for duty at noon instead of her 
scheduled 4:00 p.m. start time because she was unable to get childcare to 
cover the early start.105  The town suspended her for five days for 
insubordination.106  The arbitrator denied her grievance, finding that the 
absence of childcare was not analogous to illness, which would have 
justified refusal of the order.107 
Similarly, in Washtenaw County,108 the grievant was an attorney with 
the County Friend of the Court.109  She sought a leave covering six weeks 
during the summer when she and her common law husband would have 
custody of her husband’s two young daughters.110  The Friend of the Court 
denied the request because he was new and would be carrying out 
numerous changes and could not afford the absence of an attorney with the 
grievant’s capabilities and experience.111  She proposed working three days 
per week or taking files home to work on and reporting for work whenever 
she could.”112  The Friend of the Court denied both requests.113  The 
grievant did not appear for work on Monday of the first week that she and 
her husband had the girls.114  The Friend of the Court allowed her to use her 
last sick day for that Monday and ordered her to report for work on 
Tuesday.115  The grievant did not and she was fired.116 
The arbitrator denied her grievance.117  He held that the employer’s 
denial of her leave requests was not arbitrary or capricious, opining that the 
denial “seem[ed] based upon a fair analysis of the work commitment that 
was expected of the grievant . . . .  [I]t would appear that an attorney of the 
grievant’s extraordinary capabilities and admirable work habits would be 
sorely missed and put the department at a great disadvantage were her 
leave granted.”118 
Finding the leave of absence denial proper, he also upheld her 
 104. 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513 (1991) (Stewart, Arb.). 
 105. Id. at 513. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 514. 
 108. 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513 (1982) (Daniel, Arb.). 
 109. Id. at 513. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 514. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Washtenaw County, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513, 514 (1982) (Daniel, Arb.). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 516. 
 118. Id. at 515. 
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odation.126 
 
 
discharge.119  In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator stated: 
What possible response could an employer have in such a 
situation other than termination of the employee.  To permit her 
to continue at her whim as to which days she would work or not 
would simply be accepting her terms of employment and, in 
effect, granting the leave of absence which already had been 
denied.  There was absolutely no assurance from the grievant of 
any absolute commitment to her employment but rather that it 
would all depend upon her ability to get a babysitter or make 
some other arrangements.  None of the alternatives were viable in 
the eyes of the employer and properly so.120 
The arbitrator further opined: 
There is no doubt whatsoever in this case that the grievant was 
acting out of unselfish and commendable motivation to provide 
for two young children a type of stability that they had not 
experienced before.  The grievant at the time was certainly 
capable and able to weigh in the balance her employment against 
the urgency of her personal problems.  She made her choice at 
that time and who is to say it was not the wisest.  However, 
having made that decision she lacks standing to complain about 
the loss of the employment.121 
In contrast, in Jones Operation & Maintenance Co.,122 the grievant 
had been starting her shift at 9:00 a.m. to accommodate her childcare 
needs.  She took maternity leave.123  Upon her return, the employer 
required that she begin her shift at 7:30 a.m.124  She was unable to find 
childcare for that shift and was terminated.125  The arbitrator sustained her 
grievance because the employer was unable to justify its denial of the 
request for schedule accomm
In Rochester Psychiatric Center,127 a single parent worked the 3:00 - 
11:20 p.m. shift.  Mandatory overtime rotated among all employees.128  The 
grievant knew when her name reached the top of the rotation list but did 
not know when she would be tapped for overtime.129  Determination of the 
 119. Id. at 516. 
 120. Washtenaw County, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 513, 515 (1982) (Daniel, Arb.). 
 121. Id. at 516. 
 122. 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 239 (1989) (Schwartz, Arb.). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 239-40. 
 126. Id. at 243. 
 127. 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 725, 726 (1986) (Babiskin, Arb.). 
 128. Id. at 726. 
 129. Id. 
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need for overtime, usually a second eight hour shift, was made late in the 
shift and grievant was unable to obtain childcare on such short notice.130  
Grievant refused to work the overtime and was suspended.131  She refused a 
second time and was suspended again.132  When she refused a third time, 
the employer fired her.133 
The arbitrator opined, “No person should be forced to choose between 
his children or his livelihood.”134  He further stated, “No arbitrator on earth 
would sustain discharge on the facts of this case.”135  He reduced the 
discharge to a one dollar fine and required the parties to agree on three days 
per month, arranged thirty days in advance, during which the grievant 
would be available to work overtime.136 
A systematic survey of all published arbitration awards found widely 
divergent approaches to discipline and discharge grievances where the 
incident giving rise to the adverse employment action arose out of a work-
family conflict.137  Many of the reported awards are difficult to reconcile, at 
least on their face.  Some appear to regard family responsibilities as 
personal to the employee and as matters that the employer has a right to 
expect not to interfere with job performance.  Others seem to regard family 
responsibilities as a relevant factor that employers must consider in 
assessing discipline and seem to find implicit in the just cause requirement 
a requirement that employers attempt to accommodate such 
responsibilities. 
The role of societal values and arbitral intuition in arbitrator decision-
making begs the question of what factors may explain the divergent results 
in the published arbitration awards dealing with discipline and discharge 
resulting from work-family conflicts.  Specifically, although consideration 
of grievances with family-work conflict at their core should not be affected 
by the gender of the grievant, there is reason to suspect that it might.  The 
typical finding in the vast social psychology literature on stereotyping is 
that individual members of stereotyped groups are judged consistently with 
group stereotypes.138  With regard to gender, this means that individual 
 130. Id. at 726-27. 
 131. Id. at 726. 
 132. Id. at 727. 
 133. Rochester Psychiatric Center, 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 725, 727 (1986) (Babiskin, 
Arb.). 
 134. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 728. 
 137. MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT UNION STYLE:  LABOR 
ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING FAMILY CARE (American University Center for Worklife Law, 
2004), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/conflictunionstyle.pdf. 
 138. See generally DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING (2004) 
(focusing on the development of categorical stereotypes and their effects on society); 
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women tend to be judged as less aggressive, more emotional, more 
nurturing, less competent in workplace settings, and less capable in 
leadership roles than comparable men.139 
Furthermore, parental status affects judgment about workplace 
competence as well.  Studies show that students perceive employed 
mothers and fathers as differentially effective in the workplace.  Numerous 
researchers have documented that college students perceive employed 
mothers as less nurturing, less professionally competent, less reliable, and 
less committed to the workforce than single women and fathers.140  In 
Brewer, supra note 6, at 3 (defining stereotyping). 
 139. See generally Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Gender- and Race-based 
Standards of Competence:  Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for 
Devalued Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 544, 544-57 (1997) (discussing that 
members of devalued groups are judged on lower minimum standards and must work harder 
to demonstrate their ability); Jennifer Boldry et al., Gender Stereotypes and the Evaluation 
of Men and Women in Military Training, 57 J. SOC. ISS. 689, 689-705 (2001) (linking the 
lower evaluations of women involved in military training to gender stereotypes); Kay 
Deaux, From Individual Differences to Social Categories:  Analysis of a Decade’s Research 
on Gender, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 105, 105-16 (1984) (describing research showing the 
prevalence of gender stereotypes, including traits that are more likely to be ascribed to 
women); Alice H. Eagly & V. J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from the Distribution of 
Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 735, 735-54 (1984) 
(describing stereotypical beliefs attributed to the sexes and tracing these beliefs to the 
differing distribution of men and women in various social roles); Madeline E. Heilman, 
Description and Prescription:  How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women’s Ascent up the 
Organizational Ladder, 57 J. SOC. ISS. 657, 657-74 (2001) (arguing that gender stereotypes 
lead to gender bias because of the discrepancy between stereotypes of women and the skills 
viewed as necessary for upper-level management positions). 
 140. See e.g., Judith S. Bridges & Claire Etaugh, College Students’ Perceptions of 
Mothers:  Effects of Maternal Employment-Childrearing Pattern and Motive for 
Employment, 32 SEX ROLES 735, 747-48 (1995) (discussing studies in which mothers 
continuously employed during pregnancy were seen as less committed than other 
employees); Judith S. Bridges et. al, Trait Judgments of Stay-at-home and Employed 
Parents:  A Function of Social Role and/or Shifting Standards?, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 
140, 147-49 (2002) (discussing the perception that working mothers are less in communion 
with their jobs and their children than working fathers); Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When 
Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISS. 701, 711-14 
(2004) (discussing a loss in perceived confidence in women upon becoming mothers); 
Claire Etaugh & Cara Moss, Attitudes of Employed Women Toward Parents Who Choose 
Full-time or Part-time Employment Following Their Child’s Birth, 44 SEX ROLES 611, 616-
18 (2001) (discussing the perception that full-time employees experience more stress and 
are less family-oriented than reduced-time employees); Claire Etaugh & Denise Folger, 
Perceptions of Parents Whose Work and Parenting Behaviors Deviate from Role 
Expectations, 39 SEX ROLES 215, 221-22 (1998) (investigating the perceptions of 
employment status of parents following the birth of a child); Kathleen Fuegen et al., 
Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace:  How Gender and Parental Status Influence 
Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60, J. SOC. ISSUES 737, 748-49 (2004) (discussing 
the polarizing effects of parenthood and the judgment holding mothers to stricter 
employment standards than fathers); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood 
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research examining parental status and hiring decisions, application letters 
were mailed to several accounting firms.  Among other variables, the 
applicant’s gender and parental status were manipulated.  Employers were 
less likely to contact mothers.  However, fatherhood did not affect a male 
applicant’s success.141  Recent research found that mothers are less likely 
than childless women to receive call-backs in response to job applications, 
whereas fathers received more call-backs than childless men.142  Negative 
attitudes toward mothers may stem from the perception that employed 
mothers deviate from gender expectations.  Employed fathers, by contrast, 
conform to the role of provider.143  Arbitrators, acting upon such 
stereotypes, may treat mothers more harshly and with less sympathy when 
considering grievances. 
On the other hand, the opposite may be true.  Since family 
interference with fathers’ work life violates societal expectations for men, 
arbitrators may treat men more harshly while considering work life 
grievances.  For example, an arbitrator may view a father who refuses an 
overtime shift because of childcare concerns more negatively than a 
woman who does the same because childcare is not in the male domain.144 
Of course, the recent demographic changes in the workplace might 
have influenced gender roles so that gender does not affect arbitrator 
decision-making.  Norms of fairness focus on the merits of a case rather 
than the grievant’s individual attributes.  Social psychology literature 
suggests that factors such as gender play a smaller role in perceptions if 
large amounts of individuating information are available.145  For example, 
as a Status Characteristic, 60 J. SOC. ISS. 683, 690-92 (2004) (citing studies that show that 
college students perceive full-time employed mothers to be less committed, professional and 
nurturing than their peers). 
 141. Michael Firth, Sex Discrimination in Job Opportunities for Women, 8 SEX ROLES 
891, 898 (1982) (examining the extent of sex discrimination in the job market for 
accountants). 
 142. Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job:  Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. 
SOC. 1297 (2007) (discussing the substantial wage penalty suffered by mothers and 
demonstrating hiring bias against mothers). 
 143. See, e.g., Bridges & Etaugh, supra note 140 at 39; Fuegen et al., supra note 140 at 
40. 
 144. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1047 
(1994) (focusing on work-leave policies for fathers); Martin H. Malin Fathers and Parental 
Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25 (1998) (exploring restrictions on work-leave 
policies for fathers).  See generally B. Ann Bettencourt et al., Evaluations of Ingroup and 
Outgroup Members:  The Role of Category-Based Expectancy Violation, 33 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 244, (1997) (examining the role of category-based evaluation 
and the effects of its violation). 
 145. See generally Ziva Kunda & Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions from Stereotypes, 
Traits, and Behaviors:  A Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction Theory, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 284 
(1996) (examining how stereotypes combine with other information about people to affect 
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when all one knows about a worker is his or her gender, that knowledge 
may guide evaluations in a stereotypical direction.  But with a high degree 
of knowledge about a worker’s performance, circumstances, etc., the role 
of gender in an evaluation of that worker may weaken.  Thus, while gender 
stereotypes may generally lead a female worker to be evaluated more 
negatively than a male worker, specific knowledge that a man and woman 
both have good performance records (or bad performance records), for 
example, typically results in judgments being driven largely by that 
specific, individuating information and much less so by gender. 
In short, the literature on how stereotypes guide judgments of others 
provides abundant evidence that gender and other social category 
memberships (e.g., race, age, socioeconomic status) can bias judgment in 
stereotypical directions.  At the same time, we know that gender 
stereotypes can operate paradoxically, such that a father may be perceived 
as a better parent than a mother (presumably because he is being evaluated 
with respect to lower expectations for his group), that violations of gender 
roles may harm both men and women, and that some situational factors 
such as amount of knowledge may mitigate stereotyping effects.146  The 
external validity of much of the research supporting these conclusions is 
questionable, however, because it has been carried out with samples of 
undergraduates rather than with “real-world” decision makers such as 
arbitrators, hence the focus of the present research. 
Though not extensive, there is a literature that has focused specifically 
on the role of grievant gender in the arbitration context.  In one 
experimental study, gender of both arbitrator and grievant had no impact on 
judgments,147 but in another study by the same authors, female grievants 
were treated more favorably than male grievants, particularly by female 
arbitrators.148  Several published studies of actual arbitration decisions have 
impressions). 
 146. See Diane Kobrynowicz & Monica Biernat, Decoding Subjective Evaluations:  How 
Stereotypes Provide Shifting Standards, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 579, 579-601 
(1997) (examining how subjective evaluations relevant to stereotypes are translated into 
open-ended descriptions, objective judgments, and Likert-type ratings); Ziva Kunda et al., 
Equal Ratings but Separate Meanings:  Stereotypes and the Construal of Traits, 72 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 720, 720-34 (1997) (exploring the effects of stereotypes on 
the meaning of traits used to describe groups and their members). 
 147. S. L. Oswald & S. B. Caudill, Experimental Evidence of Gender Effects in 
Arbitration Decisions, 4 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 271 (1991) (discussing the arbitrator gender 
and arbitrator-grievant gender effects on the decisions of arbitrators on a hypothetical sexual 
harassment case). 
 148. S. B. Caudill & S. L. Oswald, A Sequential Selectivity Model of the Decisions of 
Arbitrators, 14 MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 261 (1993) (discussing the arbitrator gender and 
arbitrator-grievant gender effects on the decisions of arbitrators on a hypothetical drug-
testing case). 
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also found that arbitrators treated female grievants more favorably than 
male grievants,149 with one finding no effects related to the grievant’s 
gender.150  However, these field studies typically have not controlled for 
factors such as severity of the workplace offense.  One field study which 
did control for severity of offense found no gender effects in arbitrator 
decision making,151 but another doing the same found that female grievants 
were less successful than male grievants.152 
A review of the published research specific to arbitral decision-
making demonstrates mixed results regarding the effects of grievant 
gender.  The field studies that have been done are useful, but of course they 
are limited in that case attributes vary tremendously and confounding 
variables may exist between grievant demographics and case features, or 
between arbitrator characteristics and case features, etc.  The experimental 
work that has been done is also limited in that predictors tend to be varied 
only in isolation (as in studies that manipulate only grievant sex effects), 
and testing of interactions between arbitrator and grievant features is rare.  
The present research attempts to answer the questions left open by these 
case studies and experiments. 
In the research described below, we asked arbitrators to make 
judgments in four cases, all relevant to work-family conflicts.  In each case, 
we varied other features of the grievant in addition to gender, such as 
marital status and conflict based on child versus eldercare.  This method 
allows for determination of the relative weight of gender in arbitral 
decision making compared to, and in interaction with, these other features. 
 149. Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 63 (1988) (investigating statistics showing that female grievants were more likely to 
have their grievances sustained than male grievants when the arbitrator was male); Brian 
Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discipline Arbitration:  Evidence from British Columbia, 31 
ACAD.MGMT. J. 699 (1988) (discussing further evidence of gender bias in arbitration 
results); Brian Bemmels, The Effect of Grievants’ Gender on Arbitration Decision, 41 
Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 251 (1988) (discussing the role of gender in grievance arbitration). 
 150. Jack E. Steen et al., A Reexamination of Gender Bias in Arbitration Decisions, 45 
LAB. L.J. 298 (1994) (focusing on gender bias in arbitration decisions considering an influx 
of women into the market). 
 151. Dan R. Dalton et al., The ‘Iron Law of Paternalism’ in Employee Grievances and 
Arbitration?  A Comparison of Disciplinary and Nondisciplinary Cases, 10. EMP. RESP. & 
RTS. J. 291 (1997) (finding that the results of arbitration show no statistically significant 
dependence on the gender of the arbitrator). 
 152. Debra J. Mesch, Arbitration and Gender:  An Analysis of Cases Taken to 
Arbitration in the Public Sector, 24 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
207 (1995) (showing data that indicates women tend to lose more cases and receive fewer 
compromise outcomes than men in arbitrations). 
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B.  Study Methodology 
Participants were 284 arbitrators (236 male, 48 female) who replied to 
a request to participate in a study about arbitration decisions.  The 
population from which this sample was drawn included all 634 members 
(as of fall 2004) of the National Academy of Arbitrators,153 each of whom 
received a solicitation letter by mail.  This represents a response rate of 
44.8%.154  Participants could either complete the paper-and-pencil 
instrument included with the solicitation letter or could choose to visit a 
website that linked to an on-line version of the same instrument.  Eighty-
nine percent of respondents completed the paper-and-pencil version. 
Each participant was exposed to four case vignettes, each depicting a 
labor grievance, and was asked to render a judgment on the grievance (“I 
would sustain the grievance in its entirety,” “I would sustain the grievance 
in part,” or “I would not sustain the grievance”).  Each of the four cases 
involved an employee filing a grievance after being fired or suspended; 
each case also kept the merits of the case constant but varied two important 
details.  First, in each case, the grievant was described as either a man or 
woman (manipulation of “grievant sex”), and second, one other aspect of 
each grievant’s background or history was manipulated.  These four case 
vignettes are described below: 
Case One described a police officer (male or female) grieving a 
suspension for insubordination after failing to report for duty eight hours 
early because of childcare problems.  For half of the respondents, the police 
officer was depicted as a single parent; for the other half, as a married 
parent (manipulation of grievant marital status). 
Case Two described an employee (male or female) grieving his/her 
firing after three occasions of refusing to work a second shift on overtime 
on short notice.  For half of the respondents, the employee refused overtime 
because she or he was a single parent of two children and had been having 
difficulties finding childcare on short notice; for the other half, because she 
 153. National Academy of Arbitrators Home Page, www.naarb.org (last visited Oct. 9, 
2008).  The National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) represents the elite membership of 
labor arbitrators in the United States and Canada.  Applicants for NAA membership must 
have a minimum number of years of arbitration experience, must have decided a minimum 
number of cases in the five years preceding their applications, must demonstrate widespread 
acceptability as reflected in the diversity of unions and employers selecting them for cases, 
must receive outstanding references from NAA members, union advocates and management 
advocates, and must agree to abide by the NAA’s Code of Professional Responsibility.  It is 
common for unions and employers to mandate NAA membership when selecting arbitrators 
to hear their cases. 
 154. The population of arbitrators included 93 women and 541 men.  Thus, the response 
rate was higher for female arbitrators (51.6%) compared to male arbitrators (43.6%). 
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or he was the primary caregiver for an elderly parent and had been having 
difficulties finding elder care on short notice (manipulation of reason for 
refusal to work overtime). 
Case Three described a grievant (male or female) who was suspended 
for insubordination after refusing to extend a work shift.  For half of the 
respondents, the grievant was depicted as wanting to attend his or her 
child’s dance performance; for the other half, a prior commitment to help 
move an elderly disabled neighbor into a nursing home that would be 
difficult to reschedule was the reason for the refusal (manipulation of 
reason for refusal to work overtime). 
Case Four described a grievant (male or female) who had been fired 
after using up FMLA leave and was still having difficulty with lateness and 
missed work.  This grievant was explicitly compared to two employees 
who were coping with alcoholism for whom the employer had made special 
concessions (and not fired).  For half of the respondents, the grievant had 
used up FMLA-guaranteed leave to care for a chronically sick child; for the 
other half, the care was for a chronically sick elderly parent (manipulation 
of type of family care). 
Each arbitrator-participant was exposed to one version of each case.  
Four sequences of cases were used in the manner depicted below, and 
participants were randomly assigned to a sequence: 
 
 Case One Case Two Case Three Case Four 
Sequence 1. M- Married F- Child M- Neighbor F- Child 
Sequence 2. F- Married M- Parent F- Child M- Parent 
Sequence 3. M- Single F- Parent M- Child F- Parent 
Sequence 4. F- Single M- Child F- Neighbor M- Child 
 
After rendering a decision on each case, participants were also asked 
to judge the blameworthiness of the grievant as well as rate their level of 
sympathy for the grievant’s case.  Because these judgments generally 
followed the same pattern as the decisions, they will not be discussed here.  
At the end of the questionnaire, participants also answered a number of 
demographic questions.  The mean age of the sample was 65 (range from 
39 – 93); the mean years of experience in arbitration was 28.5 years (range 
from 5 – 58); the mean political affiliation value was 3.10 (on a scale 
ranging from 1=liberal to 7=conservative).  Roughly 64% of the sample 
practiced arbitration full-time; the most common industries represented 
were manufacturing (55%), public sector (44%), education (38%), and 
transit (33%). 
For each case, decisions were converted into a scale ranging from 1-3, 
where 1 was a decision not to sustain a grievance, 2 was sustenance in part, 
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and 3 was sustenance of the grievance in its entirety.  We then computed 2 
(sex of grievant) × 2 (other manipulated factor) Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVAs) on this decision variable, for each case.  Analysis of Variance 
is a statistical procedure that tests for mean differences among conditions.  
Specifically, it indicates the effects of each manipulated variable as an 
independent “main effect” (e.g., a main effect of grievant sex would 
indicate that the mean decision differed for men and women, regardless of 
the other manipulated factor), as well as the “interaction” between the 
manipulated variables.  For example, an interaction between grievant sex 
and the other factor—say, marital status—would indicate that the mean 
decision differed somewhere among the four “cells” of the sex by marital 
status matrix.  Alternatively, the effect of gender might differ when parents 
are presented as single versus married, or the effect of marital status might 
differ for men versus women.  Whenever a significant interaction was 
found in the analyses reported below, follow-up tests were used to pinpoint 
the source of the effect and to determine which cell (or cells) in the matrix 
was “driving” the interaction. 
C.  Results 
Case One, the married/single, male/female police officer, was based 
on the facts of Town of Stratford, discussed earlier.155  Although the 
arbitrator in that case denied the grievance, only 19.4% of the arbitrators in 
our study agreed.  Almost half (49.1%) responded that they would sustain 
the grievance completely and almost another third (31.5%) would have 
sustained the grievance in part. 
Decisions on this case were submitted to a Grievant Sex by Marital 
Status Analysis of Variance.  Only the main effect of Marital Status was 
significant, albeit at what is considered a “marginal level” (F(1,269) = 3.05, 
p < .08).  Overall, arbitrators were more favorable toward (more likely to 
sustain the grievance of) a married parent grievant (M = 2.38, SD = .75) 
than a single parent grievant (M = 2.21, SD = .79).  Though the interaction 
with parent sex was not significant, the relevant means are graphically 
presented in Figure 1, where the y-axis depicts the mean decision value 
ranging from 1 (do not sustain grievance) to 3 (sustain in its entirety) on the 
scale described above.  As can be seen, the tendency for more negative 
decisions for single relative to married parents held both when the parent 
was male and female.  To put this in more concrete terms, arbitrators 
sustained the grievance in its entirety 54% of the time when the grievant 
 155. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text (discussing Town of Stratford in 
detail). 
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was married, compared to 44% of the time when the grievant was a single 
parent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Two, the single mother/father of two young children or the 
primary caregiver of a chronically ill elderly parent, was based on 
Rochester Psychiatric Center.156  Although the arbitrator in that case 
opined that no arbitrator would uphold discharge on those facts, 44.8% of 
our sample disagreed and indicated that they would deny the grievance.  
Another 32.1% responded that they would sustain the grievance in part and 
only 23.1% indicated that they would sustain the grievance completely. 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Decision to 
Sustain 
Grievance 
Male Female
Grievant Sex
Figure 1: Grievance decisions in Case 1, by grievant sex and marital 
status.
Single Parent
Married Parent
 
We computed a Grievant Sex × Reason for Refusal (child care/elder 
care) ANOVA on grievance decisions in this case.  No effects were 
significant (all Fs < 1).  But when the sex of the arbitrator was also 
included in this analysis, a reliable two-way interaction emerged between 
the sex of the arbitrator and the reason for the refusal to work overtime 
(F(1,269) = 4.82, p < .05).  As depicted in Figure 2, among male 
arbitrators, there was no evidence of differential decision-making based on 
grievant features.  However, among female arbitrators, there was a reliable 
tendency to render less favorable judgments for grievants with childcare 
difficulties than for grievants with eldercare difficulties (F(1,269) = 5.65, p 
< .02).  More specifically, female arbitrators decided entirely in favor of 
grievants with eldercare concerns 40.7% of the time, compared to 14.3% in 
favor of grievants with childcare concerns. 
 
 156.  See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text (discussing Rochester Psychiatric 
Center in detail). 
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Figure 2: Grievance decisions in Case 2, by arbitrator sex and 
child/elder care
Child care
Elder care
 
Case Three presented the male/female employee who refused 
overtime to attend a child’s dance recital or to help an elderly neighbor 
move into a nursing home.  The largest group, 41.1% of respondents, 
denied the grievance.  Those that sustained the grievance were divided 
almost equally:  29.6% sustained completely and 29.3% sustained in part. 
A Grievant Sex × Reason for Refusal ANOVA indicated a main effect 
of reason for refusal (F(1,269) = 4.46, p < .05).  Arbitrators were more 
sympathetic to a grievant who refused overtime to help a neighbor (M = 
2.01, SD = .81) than to one who refused overtime to attend a child’s dance 
recital (M = 1.79, SD = .84).  This may not be surprising as the case for 
helping the neighbor move is perhaps more compelling.  It was a one-time 
event and could not be rescheduled easily; in contrast, one might 
reasonably assume that there would be future dance recitals to attend. 
 
An additional analysis that also included the sex of the arbitrator 
revealed a reliable three-way interaction (F(1,272) = 4.04, p < .05).  
Among male arbitrators, the tendency to favor grievants helping neighbors 
relative to those attending a dance recital remained significant (F(1,272) = 
5.65, p < .05) but the sex of the grievant had no effect on judgments.  Male 
arbitrators ruled entirely in the grievant’s favor 34.3% of the time when the 
refusal reason was moving a neighbor, compared to 24.8% of the time 
when the reason was attending a dance recital.  Among female arbitrators, 
however, the interaction between grievant sex and reason for refusal was 
significant (F(1,272) = 3.98, p < .05).  This interaction is depicted in 
Figure 3, where it is clear that male grievants were favored when they 
refused overtime to attend a dance recital compared to when they helped a 
neighbor, but female grievants were favored when they moved a neighbor 
relative to when they attended a dance recital.  Simple effects analyses 
indicated that these individual trends were not statistically reliable 
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(presumably because of the small sample of female arbitrators).  
Nonetheless, female arbitrators sustained the grievance in its entirety 50% 
of the time when the male grievant attended a dance recital (but only 16.7% 
of the time when he helped a neighbor move), and 44.4% of the time when 
the female grievant moved a neighbor (but only 28.5% of the time when 
she attended a dance recital).  Again, among male arbitrators, those who 
refused overtime to help an elderly neighbor were favored over dance 
recital attendees, regardless of grievant sex.   
 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Decision to 
sustain 
grievance 
Male Female
Grievant Sex
Figure 3: Grievance decisions in Case 3, by grievant sex and 
reason for overtime refusal, female arbitrators only
Child recital
Move neighbor
 
Case Four, the male/female employee with the chronically ill 
child/parent, injected an element not present in the other cases.  The 
grievant was compared to other employees who (1) had similar attendance 
difficulties; (2) attributed those difficulties to alcoholism; and (3) were not 
fired when they sought help for their addictions.  In this case, 30.4% of 
responding arbitrators indicated that they would sustain the grievance 
completely, 45.6% would sustain the grievance in part and 23.9% would 
deny the grievance. 
We analyzed decisions on the target’s grievance using a Grievant Sex 
X Type of Care (elder, child) ANOVA.  A main effect of type of care 
emerged (F(1,269) = 4.86, p < .05).  Arbitrators were more likely to find in 
favor of the grievant when s/he was caring for a chronically sick child (M = 
2.18, SD = .73) than when he or she was caring for a chronically sick 
parent (M = 1.98, SD = .73).  Figure 4 depicts the means separately for 
female and male grievants, but it is clear that the sex of the grievant made 
no difference in these decisions.  Overall, arbitrators found in favor of the 
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childcare provider 37% of the time but in favor of the eldercare provider 
only 25.5% of the time. 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Decision to 
sustain 
grievance 
Male Female
Grievant Sex
Figure 4: Grievance decisions in Case 4, by grievant sex and 
type of care being provided
Sick child
Sick parent
 
Interestingly, there were no significant differences between eldercare 
and childcare providers in the tendency to sustain grievances in part.  Of 
arbitrators presented with a grievant who had a sick child, 44.1% sustained 
in part.  Compare this to arbitrators presented with a grievant with a sick 
parent, which were sustained in part 46.9% of the time.  It is very likely 
that arbitrators sustaining the grievance in part viewed it as a case of 
disparate treatment and intended to reduce the discipline to a measure 
comparable to that given the two employees whose absenteeism was due to 
alcoholism.  Thus, the impact of childcare versus eldercare responsibilities 
seemed to matter among arbitrators who viewed the case independently of 
the alcoholic employees and either sustained the grievance entirely or 
denied it. 
An additional analysis that included sex of the arbitrator revealed a 
tendency for female arbitrators to rule in favor of the grievant more often 
than male arbitrators (regardless of grievant attributes F(1,268) = 4.93, p < 
.05, Ms = 2.27 and 2.03, respectively).  That is, across all versions of this 
case, female arbitrators sustained the grievance in its entirety 41.7% of the 
time, while male arbitrators did so 28.5% of the time. 
In addition to gender, we also considered whether other demographic 
features of arbitrators played a role in their decision-making.  Eighty-five 
percent of the arbitrators in this sample were parents.  Perhaps because of 
this skew, we found no evidence that parental status mattered for decision 
making in any of these cases (all relevant ps > .27). 
On average, the arbitrators had 28.5 years of experience (SD = 9.23, 
range = 5 - 58 years).  Female arbitrators (M = 23.6 years, SD = 7.38) not 
only had significantly less experience than male arbitrators (M = 29.4 
years, SD = 9.26, t(255) = 3.74, p < .01), but were younger as well (M = 
  
206 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
 
59.8 versus 66.2, p < .01). 
For each of the four cases, we entered the two manipulated case 
variables (e.g., sex and marital status in Case One), years of experience in 
arbitration (centered), and all possible interactions (with arbitrator sex as a 
covariate) into a multiple regression equation.  In two cases (Cases 1 and 
3), experience affected arbitrator decision making.157 
Specifically, in Case One, the three-way interaction between sex of 
grievant, marital status of grievant, and arbitrator experience was 
significant (B = .05, SE = .02, t(245) = 2.02, p < .05).158  We decomposed 
this interaction by conducting Grievant Marital Status × Experience 
regressions within each level of grievant sex, and found no effects in the 
case of female grievants, ps > .25 (see top panel of Figure 5), but a reliable 
two-way interaction in the case of male grievants, B = .03, SE = .02, t(117) 
= 1.99, p < .05 (see bottom panel).  Simple slopes analysis indicated that 
this interaction was driven by the effect of marital status among arbitrators 
with low experience:  married male grievants were particularly likely to be 
favored over single male grievants when arbitrators had little experience (B 
= -.52, SE = .25, t(244) = 2.05, p < .05).  No other simple slope effects 
were significant (ps > .14) though there was a trend for married male 
grievants also to be favored over married female grievants among those 
with low arbitration experience (p = .12). 
 
 157. We also found some evidence that political ideology (liberalism or conservatism) 
moderated judgments, with liberals tending to favor female over male grievants and 
conservatives tending to favor male over female grievants, particularly when childcare 
issues were involved.  For a full report of these findings, see Monica Biernat & Martin H. 
Malin, Political Ideology and Labor Arbitrators’ Decision-Making in Work-Family Conflict 
Cases, 34 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 880 (2008). 
 158. This effect remained significant when age was controlled for in the analysis.  When 
age was substituted for experience in the regression, the comparable Age × Grievant Sex × 
Marital Status interaction was not significant, p > .90.  This suggests that the effect was 
driven by arbitration experience and not by age. 
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Figure 5. Arbitration experience as a predictor of grievance decisions,  
by grievant sex and marital status, Case One159 
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In Case Three, grievance decisions were affected by Arbitration 
Experience as a main effect (B = .02, SE = .01, t(244) = 2.26, p < .03) and 
by the Experience × Reason interaction (B = -.04,  SE = .02, t(244) = 2.83, 
p < .01).160  As can be seen in Figure 6, arbitration experience predicted 
 
 159. Values are plotted in Figures using the value of the continuous variable, experience, 
set at one standard deviation above and below the mean. 
 
 160. This effect remained significant when age was controlled in the regression.  But 
when age replaced experience in a comparable regression equation, the Age × Reason 
interaction was also significant, p < .01.  Thus, this effect is not uniquely attributable to 
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increased likelihood of sustaining a grievance for workers who refused 
overtime to help move an elderly neighbor (simple slope B = .02, SE = .01, 
t(244) = 2.28, p < .02) but insignificantly less likelihood of sustaining a 
grievance for workers who refused overtime to attend a child’s dance 
recital (p > .40).  This interaction was also driven by the significant effect 
of reason for refusal to work overtime among those with greater arbitration 
experience (B = -.84, SE = .27, t(244) = 3.10, p < .01), an effect that was 
marginally significant (and reversed) among those with less arbitration 
experience (B = .45, SE = .26, t(244) = 1.72, p < .09). 
 
Figure 6. Arbitration experience as a predictor of decision-making,  
by reason for refusal to work overtime, Case Three 
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experience but rather could equally well be termed an age effect.  Indeed, the fact that those 
who helped the elderly were judged favorably by elder arbitrators may make self-interest a 
viable explanation for this effect. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
As a primary finding, this study determined that straightforward 
gender bias is largely absent from arbitration decisions.  The only case 
where the grievant’s gender made a difference in the likely outcome of the 
grievance was Case Three, and then only for female arbitrators.  However, 
because of the small sample size of female arbitrators, the result was not 
statistically significant. 
On the other hand, our study revealed potential implicit bias against 
single parents.  In Case One, if arbitrators had differentiated among 
grievants based on marital status, we would have intuitively expected them 
to favor single parents, on the assumption that married parents might have 
called on their spouses for assistance in order to work the emergency call-
in.  Yet arbitrators’ reactions were completely opposite to this intuitive 
hunch, treating the single parents significantly more negatively than the 
married parents.  This was particularly so when arbitrators with relatively 
less experience in labor arbitration judged male grievants.  Police officers 
who are single fathers may be unusual or contrary to the occupational 
“prototype.”  This bias may therefore reflect animosity toward the atypical 
worker, a bias that was overcome among those with more arbitration 
experience. 
Arbitral experience also played a significant role in Case Three, where 
increased experience enhanced the tendency to favor the neighbor-helping 
grievant.  If one argues that it is unreasonable to be biased against single 
parents but reasonable to favor an employee who makes a one-time, time-
constrained commitment to help a needy neighbor, the results can be 
construed as indicating that arbitration experience increased reasonable 
decision-making.  It is interesting to note, however, that when the grievant 
was male, female arbitrators favored the father choosing to attend his 
daughter’s dance recital over the neighbor-helper (see Figure 3).  This 
reversal may reflect female arbitrators’ greater receptivity to (and 
appreciation of) men acting outside of traditional gender roles.161  
Interestingly, past research that has specifically examined how female 
arbitrators respond to female versus male grievants has typically found no 
gender differences.162  But our data suggest that female arbitrators may 
 161. Mary E. Kite, Changing Times, Changing Gender Roles:  Who Do We Want Women 
and Men To Be?, HANDBOOK OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN AND GENDER 215-27 
(Rhoda K. Unger ed. 2004). 
 162  See Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration, 42 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 63 (1988); William J. Bigoness, & Philip B. Dubose, Effects of Gender on 
Arbitrators’ Decisions. 28 ACAD. MGMT. J., 485 (1985); Clyde Scott & Elizabeth Shadoan, 
The Impact of Gender on Arbitration Decisions, 10 J. LAB. RESEARCH 429 (1989). 
 162  See Brian Bemmels, Gender Effects in Discharge Arbitration, 42 INDUS. & LAB. 
  
210 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
 
demonstrate a more nuanced form of gender bias in their favoring of 
nontraditional men. 
Our findings in Case Four reflect that among arbitrators who did not 
analyze the case as one of disparate treatment vis-à-vis the two alcoholic 
grievants, there was significant bias favoring grievants with sick children 
over grievants with sick parents.  Unlike Case One, arbitrator experience 
did not mitigate the resulting bias.  Yet, unlike Case Three, one cannot say 
objectively that the case of the grievant caring for the sick child was more 
compelling than the case of the grievant caring for the sick parent.  These 
data may indicate that providing eldercare is unlikely to evoke much 
sympathy when given as an explanation for work-family conflict.  
However, female arbitrators, overall, were more sympathetic to the Case 
Four grievant, regardless of the kind of care (child or elder) that the 
grievant was providing.  This effect may be based in the reality of women’s 
greater involvement in all care giving roles relative to men’s involvement. 
What may explain the overall absence of bias based on grievant 
gender but the presence of bias based on grievant marital status?  Further, 
what may explain the difference in bias depending on whether the caregiver 
is caring for a child or a parent?  It is likely that arbitrators and professional 
adjudicators such as judges and administrative agency personnel have a 
heightened awareness of the potential for gender and/or racial and ethnic 
bias.  Awareness of the potential for bias plays a major role in combating it.  
On the other hand, there is probably minimal, if any, awareness among 
arbitrators of the potential for bias either against single parents or in favor 
of childcare givers over eldercare givers.163 
Our study shows that awareness and experience may mitigate 
cognitive biases affecting adjudicative decision-making.  But how can 
cognitive biases be lessened among inexperienced adjudicators such as 
jurors?  Professor Jody Armour has urged that attorneys be allowed to 
comment directly on parties’ and witnesses’ races to counteract potential 
racial biases implicit in jurors.164  Additionally, a more systematic method 
REL. REV. 63 (1988); William J. Bigoness, & Philip B. Dubose, Effects of Gender on 
Arbitrators’ Decisions. 28 ACAD. MGMT. J., 485 (1985); Clyde Scott & Elizabeth Shadoan, 
The Impact of Gender on Arbitration Decisions, 10 J. LAB. RESEARCH 429 (1989). 
 163. Studies of judges have shown how the use of cognitive shortcuts can lead to 
erroneous decision-making.  See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench:  How Judges 
Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-29 (2007) (hypothesizing that judges may make 
decisions using their intuitive system, which may lead to erroneous or unjust results); Chris 
Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784-821 (2001) (using an 
empirical study to show that judges may use heuristics to make decisions, which may be 
erroneous). 
 164. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:  Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the 
Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 768-70 (1995). 
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of heightening juror awareness of the potential for cognitive biases may 
prove successful.  For example, the standard orientation given to jurors 
could include a discussion of cognitive biases and implicit stereotyping. 
Finally, a closing caveat to our study should be mentioned.  Our study 
presented arbitrators with much more limited case information than they 
would normally receive in actual grievance hearings and the consequences 
of their decisions were only hypothetical.  This artificiality may limit our 
ability to generalize our findings.  Nevertheless, the experimental method 
used in our study has many advantages over field studies, most notably the 
ability to carefully control case features and isolate their effects.  The 
arbitrators in our study seemed to take the cases seriously as well, often 
offering lengthy explanations for their decisions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We began our study with a consideration of stereotyping and the 
tendency for individuals to demonstrate bias without awareness.  Concerns 
about the effects of gender bias in the context of the changing 
demographics of the workplace and the difficulties of balancing work and 
family life prompted our study of labor arbitrators.  These difficulties can 
give rise to problems in the workplace, such as poor attendance, tardiness, 
lack of availability, and lack of flexibility, that may result in suspension or 
discharge; this may lead to grievances that eventually find their way to a 
group of important decision-makers, labor arbitrators.  Our study question 
centered on whether features of the grievants and the labor arbitrators 
themselves mattered for the outcomes of these cases. 
Our findings point to the complexity of the decision-making process 
and the fact that biases reveal themselves in subtle rather than 
straightforward ways.  By examining decision-making in four cases, we 
tested whether one particular type of arbitrator tended to have more or less 
bias than another, simply based on their arbitrator characteristics.  We did 
not find such a result.  Instead, arbitrator characteristics sometimes 
predicted decision-making, but were dependent on other features of the 
case such as the sex of the grievant and/or the nature of the workplace 
problem, and attributes of the arbitrator, such as his or her sex and/or 
previous arbitration experience. 
These findings resonate with the broader social psychological 
literature that emphasizes the situational sensitivity of discrimination and 
bias.  Situational norms,165 the nature of the judgment of decision,166 and 
 165. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in 
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 66-73 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner 
eds., 1986). 
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the quality and quantity of additional information about a target167 have all 
been found to moderate the extent to which stereotyping based on social 
category membership occurs.  The present results point to the importance 
of using more complex research designs to study adjudicator decision-
making and, more generally, of taking a more nuanced approach to 
understanding when and how attributes of the decision-maker may produce 
biased decisions. 
 166. Monica Biernat, Toward a Broader View of Social Stereotyping, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1019, 1020-24(1993). 
 167. Ziva Kunda & Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions from Stereotypes, Traits, and 
Behaviors:  A Parallel-Constraint- Satisfaction Theory, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 284, 289-91 
(1996). 
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APPENDIX 
Case vignettes (with italicized font indicating variations across 
conditions). 
Case One: 
Grievant was a male/female police officer for a mid-sized municipality 
who was called in early on emergency overtime.  Grievant was called at 
11:00 a.m. and ordered to report at noon.  Grievant’s usual start time was 8 
p.m.  Grievant refused the order because she/he did not have childcare 
available (grievant was a married parent of a two-year-old; his wife/her 
husband was unavailable to care for the child/a single parent of a two-year 
old).  Grievant made several phone calls to neighbors, friends, and his/her 
regular childcare provider trying to find childcare but was unable to do so.  
Grievant called the supervisor and explained the situation and the 
supervisor ordered him/her to report at noon.  Grievant continued to look 
for childcare and finally reached his/her regular childcare provider who 
said she could arrive at Grievant’s home by 5:45 p.m.  Grievant reported at 
6 p.m.  She/He was suspended for insubordination. 
Case Two: 
Grievant was the primary caregiver for his/her chronically ill elderly 
parent/was a single mother/father of two children, ages three and five, who 
worked the 3:00 - 11:20 p.m. shift at a hospital.  Mandatory overtime 
rotated among all employees.  Grievant knew when his/her name reached 
the top of the rotation list but did not know when she/he would be asked for 
overtime.  There was no discernable pattern to when the employer required 
overtime.  Determination of the need for overtime, usually a second eight 
hour shift, was made late in the shift and Grievant was unable to obtain 
substitute care for his/her parent/child on such short notice.  Grievant 
explained the situation to his/her supervisor who replied, “You know the 
system.  You’ll just have to find a way to cover it.”  Grievant refused to 
work the overtime and was reprimanded.  Grievant attempted to find 
individuals who could be available to watch his/her parent/his/her children 
overnight on very short notice but was unsuccessful.  His/Her regular 
caregiver/sitter told him/her she could not stay beyond 1:00 a.m. unless she 
had two weeks’ notice.  Grievant advised his/her supervisor who repeated 
that Grievant would have to find a way to fulfill his/her job responsibilities.  
Grievant refused the mandatory overtime a second time and was 
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suspended.  When Grievant refused a third time, the employer fired 
him/her. 
Case Three: 
 Contract requires Employer to equalize overtime, both voluntary 
and mandatory.  Employer must offer overtime on a voluntary basis to 
employees beginning with those who worked the least amount of overtime; 
if no one volunteers, Employer may force overtime on employees with the 
least amount of overtime and the least amount of seniority.  Grievant had 
the least amount of overtime and the least amount of seniority and she/he 
was ordered to extend his/her shift by four hours.  She/He refused because 
{she/he had made a commitment to help his/her disabled neighbor move 
into a nursing home that evening.  For the past four years, Grievant had 
cared for his/her neighbor who had no family members living nearby.  
Finally, Grievant persuaded the neighbor’s two children to move their 
father to a nursing home but the children agreed to do so only if Grievant 
would oversee the move.  Because of the nursing home’s requirements, the 
move had to be arranged three weeks in advance and if it did not take place 
on the scheduled day, it could not be rescheduled for another month.}/ 
{his/her 10-year old daughter was performing in a dance recital that 
evening at her school.  This performance was very important to the child 
and Grievant had promised to attend.}  Grievant explained the situation to 
his/her supervisor and offered to work the next time overtime was required.  
The supervisor replied, “The contract requires you to work overtime now.”  
Grievant refused.  Employer forced the next person on the overtime list and 
suspended Grievant for insubordination. 
Case Four: 
The employer’s attendance control plan assessed occurrence points for 
tardiness, early departure, unexcused absence and failure to call in when 
absent or late.  After accruing four points, an employee received a verbal 
warning.  After six points, the employee received a written warning.  After 
eight points, the employee received a one-day suspension and a final 
warning.  After ten points, the employee was subject to discharge.  When 
an employee reached ten points, a meeting was convened between the 
employee and a union representative to discuss whether the employee 
would be discharged.  In most cases, the employer discharged the 
employee.  However, in two cases, the employees admitted at the meeting 
that their absences resulted from alcohol abuse and that they were at their 
wits’ end and needed help.  In each case, the employer referred the 
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employee to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and agreed that if 
the employee completed the EAP and complied with all the after-care 
requirements of the EAP counselor, the employee would be reinstated 
without back pay on a last chance basis. 
The female/male Grievant, whose job tenure was comparable to that of 
the two employees discussed above, accumulated ten points, largely for 
tardiness.  Grievant had a child/cared for a parent who developed a severe 
case of Hepatitis.  The child’s/parent’s condition deteriorated necessitating 
hospitalization and eventually a donor liver was located and the 
child/parent received a liver transplant.  The child/parent was hospitalized 
for two months and Grievant was granted and used FMLA leave for the 
entire period.  Grievant continued to use FMLA leave to assist her/his 
child/parent.  Upon exhausting her/his twelve weeks of FMLA leave, 
Grievant returned to work. 
Grievant began accumulating attendance points within a few weeks of 
returning to work.  When she/he accumulated ten points, the employer 
called a meeting with Grievant and a union representative.  At the meeting, 
Grievant indicated that his/her record of tardiness was due to his/her 
having to care for his/her chronically ill child/parent.  Grievant related that 
his/her child/parent would suffer relapse attacks with no prior warning and 
Grievant would rush the child/parent to the emergency room and be up 
most of the night.  Grievant’s shift began at 6:00 a.m. and, on a sufficient 
number of occasions, Grievant was unable to get to work on time or to 
come to work at all after being awake most of the night.  Grievant always 
called in when she/he was going to be absent or tardy.  Grievant said that 
she/he did not know what to do and asked for help with the situation.  The 
union asked the employer to investigate what resources might be available 
to assist Grievant but the employer decided to terminate his/her 
employment.  The employer rejected the union’s suggestion that Grievant’s 
situation was comparable to that of the employees with alcohol problems 
who were not discharged. 
